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Abstract
This short paper offers a series of responses to Jochem Zwier and Timothy Barker’s com-
ments on my extended paper ‘Taking Exception: Philosophy of Technology as a Multidi-
mensional Problem Space.’ Part one responds to questions concerning the modality of the 
renewed understanding of the theme of the transcendental that was argued for in my initial 
paper: I argue for the deep contingency of such a move, against any sense that it is neces-
sary. Part two takes this consideration of modality further, considering the possibilities 
that a renewal of the theme of the transcendental stands to offer philosophy of technology 
today. I argue that the contingency of our contemporary sense of the transcendental can 
be precisely what makes it valuable. Whereas parts one and two turn on incisive questions 
posed by Zwier, part three closes by reconsidering the claims for a ‘multidimensional prob-
lem space’ offered in my initial paper. In response to an acute insight from Barker, I close 
by arguing that philosophy of technology’s problem space should be explored in terms of a 
notion of ‘shared agonism’.
Keywords Necessity · Contingency · Transcendental · Agonism · Postphenomenology · 
Education
Let me thank Jochem Zwier and Timothy Barker. Their papers demonstrate incisive 
engagement with mine, and are critical and generous in equal measure.
What struck me was how these papers dovetailed. I had been worrying about what this 
response paper might look like, but Zwier and Barker’s clarity solved this for me.
Zwier raised two big questions, with interesting sub-questions: ‘[W]hat exactly neces-
sitates the … rehabilitation of the transcendental?’ and ‘[W]hat does Smith’s renewal of 
transcendental philosophy imply and entail?’ (Zwier, this issue). Barker raised a closely 
related issue: does my appeal to the transcendental risk determinism? Additionally, Barker 
posed an issue that pinpointed something I had been struggling to express in the final part 
This reply refers to the article available at https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s10699- 020- 09761-2.
This reply refers to the article available at https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s10699- 020- 09762-1.
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of my paper: agonism. I will attempt to address each of these points, and as many others 
raised by Zwier and Barker as possible.
1  Necessity
Zwier’s first big question is ‘what exactly necessitates the … rehabilitation of the transcen-
dental?’ In response, a core presupposition of my paper is this: nothing necessitates it.
Some of Zwier’s remarks suggest, in the form of judicious ‘Devil’s Advocate’ points, 
that engaging the theme of the transcendental may be unnecessary in the sense of ‘redun-
dant’ or ‘superfluous’. This is because well-established approaches in philosophy of tech-
nology, such as postphenomenology, may already be doing it. As Zwier puts it in this 
excellent passage:
[W]ouldn’t a postphenomenological scholar argue that transcendental questions are 
in fact developed [in postphenomenological analyses], but in a deliberately limited 
way, for instance by focusing on how technologies make a particular experience of 
the world possible, how technologies make particular scientific objects possible, 
etc.… My question to Smith would be which transcendental motives are blocked in 
such [postphenomenological] accounts, and whether such a blockade exists de facto 
or de jure (Zwier, this issue).
I will discuss more approaches than postphenomenology, but let me focus on it first. There 
can be no doubt that transcendental questions are developed in postphenomenology, on 
at least two levels: logically, it enquires into how particular artefacts act as conditions for 
the possibility of given experiences and objects; historically, its core thinkers (Husserl 
and early Heidegger) sit very much in the post-Kantian lineage. On both levels, however, 
I think postphenomenology is rather too ‘deliberately limited’. Logically, it is often quite 
classically phenomeno-logical and anthropo-logical in its choice of artefacts and case stud-
ies. Historically, the role of the early Heidegger and Husserl within postphenomenology 
means, I think, that it tends towards a form of ‘small-c’ conservatism, where it is unable to 
see new emergences in philosophy of technology except through this lens.1
To answer Zwier’s question directly: postphenomenology assuredly has a de jure sense 
of the transcendental that it de facto blocks on at least two levels (stated differently: that it 
represses). There can be no doubt postphenomenology has made a virtue of this: its anal-
yses of conditions of possibility are fine-grained, informative and well-designed, and its 
typography of relations (embodiment, hermeneutic, alterity, background….) is insightful 
and helpful in certain (deliberately limited) cases. It’s just that postphenomenology can 
also be quite staid in its approach, and informed by a rather repetitive set of core thinkers.2 
To be sure, there are approaches drawing on postphenomenology that go beyond this. For 
1 See footnote 7 below.
2 What I mean by ‘positivism’ and ‘presentism’ is related here. Positivism presupposes the natural sciences 
to offer our best possible explanatory framework. What I mean by ‘presentism’ (although this is admit-
tedly a more nebulous term) is the tendency of certain philosophical approaches (in contemporary analytic 
philosophy, for instance) to discount thoroughgoing engagement with the history of philosophy. Both posi-
tivism and presentism can be perfectly consistent in and of themselves. What is ‘wrong’ with them is that, 
like postphenomenology (which I think evinces both tendencies (see Smith 2018: 27–33)), they block a 
metaphilosophically developed sense of the transcendental as a way of responding to new historical events 
and emergences (see below).
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instance: Malafouris’ work with Ihde (2019), Irwin on digital media (2016), Rosenberger 
on ‘callous objects’ (2017), and Selinger’s work (Frischmann and Selinger 2018). What 
I take such work to be engaged in—although none of the authors would likely put it this 
way—is the introduction of methods and concepts that exceed the usual range of postphe-
nomenological desiderata, and that de facto push the scope of a de jure sense of the tran-
scendental that postphenomenology assuredly does have.3
This leads me to the part of Zwier’s question concerning which transcendental motives 
postphenomenology blocks. Put simply: it blocks the motive to ‘get metaphilosophical’ 
or ‘go meta’.4 I am now imagining a postphenomenologist who would respond that there 
are very good reasons to block this: they might object that it’s not ‘deliberately limited’ 
enough, ‘too postmodern’, that it invites ‘useless speculation’, or that it presupposes exten-
sive knowledge of the history of philosophy when attention to artefacts before us is what is 
really required. Let me show how this might overlook something important.
I cited this extract from Floridi (2019: 204):
[W]hat interesting systems one may design… is a matter of talent, intuition, hard 
work, opportunity, good fortune, free thinking, and imagination, and many other var-
iables that are hard to pin down. As Donald Schon correctly put it, the designer (or 
indeed the logician and the philosopher and anyone who creatively designs solutions) 
is:
like a chess master who develops a feeling for the constraints and potentials [affor-
dances…] of certain configurations of pieces on the board.
In my paper, I emphasised how this point holds for systems of technological affordances, 
and sought to show how a focus on exceptional technologies as ‘interesting systems’ might 
take us beyond Floridi’s use of the chess example. What I also hinted at (footnote 8) but 
want to emphasise here is that all this also holds for systems of concepts and their relations 
(that is: philosophies).
I hold that a less ‘deliberately restrained’ tendency to ‘go meta’ in philosophy can pro-
ductively involve a more developed sense of the transcendental that can usefully zoom in 
and out on the intra- and inter-relations between diverse philosophical systems and their 
conditions of possibility.5 I also hold that this can be a good motive for philosophy of tech-
nology to develop, irrespective of how inclined to reflect on technologies any particular 
philosopher or philosophical system under consideration may have been (see Smith 2018: 
45–53). This is because, in line with the elaboration offered on Floridi’s above quote in 
my initial paper (but in a different direction), such an exercise can, I think, act as a way of 
3 A more vexed issue is whether postphenomenology’s sense of the transcendental runs into a de jure limit 
by virtue of its focus on ‘mediation’ and experience as such, insofar as this excludes whole classes of tech-
nologies, systems and processes that act as constitutive conditions for technological objects and systems. It 
is my sense that many of the main approaches in philosophy of technology (postphenomenology, but also 
critical constructivism, and Actor Network Theory) are unequipped, for instance, to deal with the complex 
ontological, political and economic issues concerning what constitutes ‘uses’ and ‘usership’ on the Internet 
today by virtue of their tendency to focus on interfaces rather than databases. Authors like Fuchs (2016), 
Dean (2009), Floridi (2019), and Chun (2016) are, I think, much better equipped for engaging these issues, 
and have urgent contributions to make to our sense of what constitutes ‘philosophy of technology’ as a field.
4 See Hofstadter (1999), Williamson (2007), and Floridi (2011: 58-60).
5 Consider, for instance, how Kant’s reflections on the transcendental emerge from a consideration of 
Hume and Leibniz alike (2000). It should also be emphasised here that I take these points to hold for phi-
losophers who are putatively ‘anti-systemic’ (for instance: Kierkegaard).
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developing the habits of thought that allow us to better conceive, clarify, critique and create 
technological artefacts and systems of all shapes and sizes.
It might be useful to consider Barker’s point about determinism here. His worry, if I 
understand it correctly, is that such a tendency to ‘go meta’ might itself be deterministic:
[I]f we locate the transcendental with real but not actual processes, does the tran-
scendental become another name for invisible technical processes? And then, are we 
rehashing a type of deterministic argument? (Barker, this issue).
The problem with ‘going meta’ in the way outlined above is that it might seem to necessi-
tate an extremely crude form of Hegelianism. For Hegel, famously, ‘the real is the rational’ 
(2003). Is it the case, then, that I think we should be studying all sorts of philosophical 
‘systems’ and their histories to arrive at a final ‘meta system’ that rationalises and deter-
mines all the other systems (whether technological or philosophical)?
If a rehabilitation of the transcendental was ‘necessary’, according to a logic the events, 
objects, and implications of which could be fully thought out in advance, it would inevi-
tably tend towards this kind of (hellish) approach. As I put it at the beginning of this part, 
however, what I am after is ‘unnecessary’. In saying this, I am not trying to be overly clever 
with words, and I don’t mean that the approach I am forwarding is redundant or superflu-
ous. I mean that it is desirable and possible as something fundamentally historically con-
tingent and open to ‘play’ (to use Barker’s excellent term).6
In fact, I take Barker’s paper to include an excellent example of the kind of ‘going 
meta’ involved in a developed sense of the transcendental, but in an unexpected (yet highly 
‘actual’) direction:
Let’s take television as an example: The images of the television, the dramas, com-
edies, news reports, political debates, sporting events, all involve multiple actors, 
agents, production companies, industry protocols, and so on, each with their own axe 
to grind. But prior to all of this is a media history of technical developments involv-
ing Nipkow disks, flickering lamps, selenium, Baird’s televisor, the work of Marconi, 
EMI, Bell Labs amongst many others, as well as the development of the electronic 
binary computer. Although these things are completely invisible in the contemporary 
television image, they provide the set of conditions for the possibility of representa-
tion and hence the possibilities for television discourse (Barker, this issue).
Barker notes in relation to this example that it is his ‘…first instinct to try and ground the 
transcendental in the real set of technical conditions upon which any mediation is based’ 
(Ibid.). My first instinct when presented with the example is to be fascinated by it, and to 
try to understand and learn from it. My second instinct is this: to acknowledge that the 
simultaneously wide-ranging and fine-grained approach Barker applies to the complex 
actual conditions of television as a technical system might also be applied to the conditions 
of any given philosophy as a conceptual ‘system’, and that both these approaches might 
have interesting things to say to one another, and to develop a sense of philosophy of tech-
nology as a many-faceted problem space.
6 Stated differently: I locate the transcendental with actual processes, not ‘real’ ones in Hegel’s sense (of 
‘rational’, ‘absolute’ and ‘teleological’). What I am after is much closer to Adorno’s ‘negative dialectics’ 
(1990), Deleuze’s sense of ‘transcendental empiricism’ (2004), or Nietzsche’s sense of ‘critical history’ 
(1999).
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When I discuss a sense of the transcendental, it is just this kind of cross pollination 
and play in considering the conditions of what is contingently and actually ‘given’ I have 
in mind. I have sought to show this through a consideration of Kant (Smith 2015). Just as 
Barker’s example might have been radio rather than television, however, nothing logically 
‘necessitates’ this. What suggests it is Kant’s status as an interesting nexus in the history of 
philosophy, and what makes it possible and desirable is the opportunity it affords to show 
how philosophy of technology might be opened up and made more dynamic as a field.
This allows me to respond to an important point raised by Zwier: ‘does this mean that 
Kant’s a priori conditions of possibility can and must themselves be traced back to [what, 
drawing on Floridi, Smith calls] their ‘conditions of feasability’?’ (Zwier, this issue). I 
really like the emphasis on feasibility here, and a proper response would require a stand-
alone paper. The short (and overly compressed) response is this: such an operation can 
happen and would, I think, have very interesting things to tell us; the sense in which it must 
happen, however, ought to be perpetually open to dispute. In fact, it is just this ‘ought’ that 
I take to be the real ethico-politicial purchase and condition for a thoroughgoing sense of 
the transcendental (see the next two parts of this paper).
This allows me to respond to this corollary point: where does this place my approach 
in relation to approaches like ‘Foucault-inspired constructivist accounts’ and Stiegler’s 
approach to Kant in Technics and Time 3? (Zwier, this issue). The short response is that I 
take these approaches to evince a much stronger sense of the transcendental than postphe-
nomenology, and to be highly relevant to expanding our sense of philosophy of technology; 
it’s just that I don’t think they ought to be assigned any kind of a priori explanatory exclu-
sivity, because there are indefinitely many other approaches (past, present, and future) that 
have interesting contributions to make.7
Nothing logically necessitates a rehabilitation of the transcendental. Instead, it is a mat-
ter of engaging with the philosophies, artefacts and histories that are actually and contin-
gently given, and of critically inquiring into the conditions of their ‘givenness’. This pro-
cess can be as theoretical as it is practical, and we shouldn’t prejudge what counts in either 
respect. For it to occur at all, actual provocations to thought are required: enter, in my 
work, the concept of ‘exceptional technologies’ and an interest in Kant, post-Kantian phi-
losophy, and the theme of the transcendental.
7 For instance: Floridi’s engagement with Kant (2019), but also Foucault’s own engagement, not merely 
with Kant (1991), but also with ancient approaches to ethics in his work on ‘technologies of the self’ 
(1998). Additionally, I have in mind work by thinkers such as Hui on Chinese philosophy of technology 
(2016), as well as work by Åsberg and Braidotti (2018) on feminist perspectives, Van Den Eede’s work on 
Bateson (2019), and Coeckelbergh’s on Wittgenstein (2017). Just as my work has involved an engagement 
with Kant, these approaches make a virtue of expanding the purview of philosophy of technology through 
appeal to different histories. Consider, in contrast, how three main currents in philosophy of technology 
today engage with the history of philosophy: Ihde’s postphenomenology, Feenberg’s critical constructivism, 
and Latour’s Actor Network Theory. Early Heidegger and parts of Husserl are the key historical references 
for Ihde; Marcuse is a key reference for Feenberg, and, while ANT’s references range all over the map, Kant 
is Latour’s key philosophical nemesis (1993). Polemically, the point is this: there can be much more to the 
constellation of thinkers informing philosophy of technology today than ‘early Heidegger + Husserl + Mar-
cuse + [not] Kant (this last ‘not’ intended as an injunction, not a contradiction)’. Although this point is exag-




Zwier’s second big question is: ‘what does Smith’s renewal of the transcendental imply and 
entail?’ Let me expand on the answer just given: nothing logically necessitates rehabilitat-
ing the transcendental, and this, I think, is what makes it valuable. Stated differently: the 
entailment and implication at stake ought to be ethico-political and historical in the first 
instance. That is: it ought to be reflexively grounded in the contingency of events and emer-
gences, rather than the logic of an underlying philosophical system worked out in advance.8
The verb I used in my initial paper was not ‘rehabilitate’ or ‘renew’, but ‘trivialise’. 
I stated that we should be ‘trivialising the transcendental’, and meant it in the sense of 
‘demystifying’ or ‘making accessible’. Opting for this term over the others, I think, is no 
mere distinction without a difference.
‘Rehabilitate’ and ‘renew’ invite this question: ‘for whom?’ One response is: ‘for those 
who have a sense of what ‘the transcendental’ is about, and that ‘it’ is a contested term 
in philosophy’. On this interpretation, ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘renewal’ ultimately seem to 
have professional philosophers or a particular sub-group thereof as their ‘for whom’ (for 
instance: philosophers of technology).
If what I was arguing for amounted to this, it might deserve calling out as something 
potentially even cruder than the caricatural Hegelianism outlined at the end of the previ-
ous part. This is because it would emerge as little more than a changing of philosophical 
fashions. It would be as if all I was saying was this: ‘there was an empirical turn, now let’s 
have a transcendental one’.
But this is not what I am saying, because it sticks to a logic of turns on the road (see 
Smith 2018: 1–6). The issue I want to get at, in contrast, is this: how can we get off road 
from philosophical fashions and their various dialectical ‘turns’, to a point where thorough-
going philosophical engagement with the complexity of matters concerning technologies is 
just a matter of educational course?
This gets at the ‘for whom?’ (or better, ‘with whom?’) of trivialising. Framed as a ques-
tion: for whom do I think the transcendental motive to ‘go meta’ should be trivialised? 
Quite simply: for everyone, as a desirable habit of resilient, reflexive and well-educated 
existence in technologically-mediated societies.
It might be objected that such an objective is quixotic. I very much beg to differ. On 
the contrary, I think there are complex events and emergences to do with technologies at 
this historical juncture that are ethically and politically compelling us to try to put more of 
something like this into our theory and practice, at all sorts of educational levels, across all 
sorts of different educational platforms and contexts.9
This is the kind of educative implication and entailment I would like to see follow 
from a thorough trivialising of the transcendental (and a trivialising of all sorts of other 
philosophical concepts, thinkers, traditions and methods as well). Faced with our received 
8 Zwier asks: ‘would a transcendental analysis of our ways of taking exception be relevant, and if so, how 
would Smith propose such an analysis is to be carried out?’ (Zwier, this issue). I take such reflexive analysis 
to be highly relevant. The remarks in this part are meant to say something about how it might be carried out.
9 Automated vehicle development and the Anthropocene, as developed in my initial paper, are two such 
issues. To cite a few others: critical engagement with forms of technological solutionism demonstrated dur-
ing the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic; issues concerning technology and intergenerational justice; reflection 
on the differences between data, information, knowledge and wisdom (Kitchin 2014); critical reflection on 
forms of reasoning by analogy and disanalogy between historical and contemporary examples (Smith 2018: 
77–105).
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institutions (and inertias) of education, this assuredly has the look of something improb-
able. It does not follow that it is impossible, undesirable or without value.
3  Shared Agonism
Barker writes:
Perhaps it is agonism, struggle, the competition against conditions, that is at stake 
in Smith’s thinking? (After all there is a lot about games in there already.) In par-
ticular, Smith gives us Floridi’s example of the philosopher as a designer, as a fig-
ure who creatively designs solutions to a problem. I would like to slightly reword 
this as someone who creatively struggles with, agonizes over, a problem, rather than 
‘solves’ or provides ‘solutions’ (Barker, this issue).
In the final part of my paper, I presented something like an allegory of agonism through an 
elaboration on Morton’s carpark example. With far greater clarity, Barker has named what 
I was agonising over (not without irony!): the status of agonism, not merely in philosophy 
of technology, but philosophy per se.
What grabs me about Barker’s point is the emphasis on agonising over problems. Before 
reading his response, my instinct when faced with ‘agonism’ would have been to think: 
‘political philosophy’, ‘dispute’, ‘conflict’. What has never really struck me about the term, 
I am not ashamed to admit, is its proximity to ‘agonising’ and ‘agony’. Barker’s point made 
these senses hit home. More than that, however, he made me reflect on how such ‘agonis-
ing’ and ‘agony’ can be shared.
I have been critical of approaches including postphenomenology in this paper, and have 
responded to Zwier and Barker frankly. This all corresponds to the received philosophical 
sense of ‘agonism’ as connoting struggle. What underlies this sense as a condition of pos-
sibility—although this can all too often be forgotten when dispute and competition become 
vain ends in themselves—is the sense of ‘agony’ and ‘agonising’ occurring in relation to 
shared problems.
Imagine philosophy itself as a kind of automated vehicle. There is a tendency throughout 
contemporary cultures to (barely) ‘tolerate’ philosophy in this way: as a vehicle smoothly 
playing out various well-rehearsed turns on its own obscure little side track. It is agonising 
to be ‘tolerated’ in this way. Taking exception to this, and building on Barker’s point con-
cerning agonism, I would like to propose something different: thoroughgoing philosophical 
education as a kind of historically-informed agonism capable of responding to emergent 
‘off road’ technological problems.10 There are two key presuppositions here: first, that we 
are not lacking in such problems; second, that all the philosophical approaches mentioned 
in this paper, plus indefinitely many more, have something to offer in sharing this agony 
(including postphenomenology!).
10 This is not to say that we should be rejecting tried and tested philosophical desiderata (proofs for the 
existence of God, or thought experiments, for instance). It is to say that we should be putting the skills they 
foster into contact with emergent problems. See, for instance, the treatment of the Trolley Problem in part 
two of my paper, and footnote 9 above.
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